The State in Democratic Breakdowns: Who, How, and Why by Andersen, David
  
 
 
 
 
THE STATE IN DEMOCRATIC 
BREAKDOWNS: WHO, HOW, AND 
WHY 
 
DAVID ANDERSEN 
 
 
  
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 2016:7 
 
QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG 
April 2016 
ISSN 1653-8919 
© 2016 by David Andersen. All rights reserved. 
 
 2 
The State in Democratic Breakdowns: Who, How, and Why 
David Andersen 
QoG Working Paper Series 2016:7 
April 2016 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is often invoked that in modern times the state is a prerequisite for democracy to endure. How-
ever, cross-national research typically applies this as a static assumption rather than a dynamic caus-
al proposition. Therefore, we are largely left in the dark about who the relevant state actors are, 
how they contribute to democratic breakdowns, and why they do so. Specifying who, how, and why 
of the state in democratic breakdowns is a vital first step in developing a better understanding of 
whether the state stabilizes democracies, including whether a disaggregation of the state concept 
matters. In this paper, I present an overall theoretical framework and observable implications to 
answer these questions. At the general level, I propose that the state – defined by either a monopo-
ly on violence, administrative effectiveness, or citizenship agreement – is relevant for containment 
of anti-systemic forces and management of security-related and socioeconomic conditions. I then 
specify seven oft-cited mechanisms which stem from weaknesses in one of the three aspects of 
state. Empirically, I examine the observable implications of these mechanisms in the 14 democratic 
breakdowns of the interwar period. This systematic examination provides a more detailed and dis-
aggregated yet also coherent understanding of the state-democracy nexus. The results indicate the 
general importance of a strong and legitimate state for democratic stability. However, disaggrega-
tion of the state is recommended to obtain more precise average and single-case inferences.     
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Causality and state-democracy research 
 
Recent reviews of research in democratization (e.g. Munck 2011) call for a more comprehensive 
theorization of the relationship between state and democracy – that is, a more specified causal rela-
tionship between state and democracy. In a special issue on what was termed the ‘state-democracy 
nexus’ (cf. Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning 2014), it was argued that a better understanding of the 
different ways in which the state may ensure the survival of free, fair, and inclusive elections was 
the most pressing concern.1 In times when the arguably greatest problem of democracy is not its 
installation but its stabilization, this agenda needs to be moved forward. In this paper, I pursue this 
in two steps: first, by building a general theoretical framework that may connect multiple types of 
state weaknesses to democratic breakdown; and second, by specifying and examining observable 
implications of seven leading theories of the state-democracy relationship on the interwar demo-
cratic breakdowns which hold some of the paradigmatic cases of democratic breakdown.  
 
The question of causality between state and democracy has typically been precluded by conflation 
of state and regime characteristics (cf. Mazzuca 2010); state-democracy theorization has ended in 
necessary yet often overly simplistic discussions of endogeneity (for a review, see Mazzuca and 
Munck 2014); or the state’s importance for democratic stability has been treated at an overall level 
and as a static assumption that leaves much causal interpretation to the reader (e.g. Linz and Stepan 
1996; Rose and Shin 2001: 333-339; Fukuyama 2005; Bratton and Chang 2006: 1059-1063; Krax-
berger 2007: 1056-1057; Møller and Skaaning 2011).2 In consequence, empirical findings have tend-
ed to cloud more than illuminate an understanding of the state-democracy relationship (Andersen, 
Møller, and Skaaning 2014: 9-10). Perhaps most notably, the so-called sequencing debate has point-
ed to the importance of political accountability for state-building in early modern Europe (Møller 
2015). While this is a very welcome take on the state-democracy nexus, the representative, mass 
democracy that was introduced in Continental Europe with the French Revolution and accelerated 
with industrialization in the 19th century (Ansell and Samuels 2014) is a different regime that has 
been associated with civil conflict and political instability shown in a context of weak stateness (see 
e.g. Rose and Shin 2001; Carothers 2002: 8-9).  
                                                     
1
 The authors noted the need for disaggregation of the concept of stateness and thinning of the concept of democracy to 
enable causal analysis of the state’s effect on democratic stability.   
2
 To be fair, scholars (e.g. Fukuyama 2014) now increasingly specify their causal propositions.  
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Hence, what is needed are a set of more dynamic causal propositions answering who, how, and why 
concerning the state’s stabilizing effect on democracies. I thus pursue the state-democracy nexus 
agenda by a disaggregated approach with multiple pathways from state to democracy. To this end, I 
capitalize on already existing research of civil-military relationships (e.g. Nordlinger 1977; Stepan 
1988), clientelism, corruption, and political polarization (e.g. O’Donnell 1973; Rothstein 2011; Cor-
nell and Lapuente 2014), and ethnic fractionalization and citizenship conflicts (e.g. Linz and Stepan 
1996; Wimmer 2013). Yet, I sharpen these theories and anchor them in a unified theory of how the 
state affects democracy under the larger condition of ongoing socioeconomic modernization (cf. 
Przeworski 2005; Ansell and Samuels 2014).  
 
To gauge the usefulness of different theories of the state-democracy relationship, we must have 
more specified knowledge on the causal mechanisms at play. I define a causal mechanism as “a 
delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or 
closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (Tilly 2001: 25-26). In turn, any causal mechanism 
of the state-democracy nexus must explicate a set of observable implications in the right sequence. 
These observable implications specify the participating actors (their properties, activities, and rela-
tions) and their attitudes and behavior as they are constrained by a given state condition (cf. 
Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 50-52). Identifying ‘who’ the relevant actors is important. If, for in-
stance, an explanation focuses entirely on party politicians or trade unionists as the drivers of dem-
ocratic breakdown, how can causality then stem from the state? Identifying ‘how’ they behave is 
equally important. For instance, explanations sometimes focus on certain social classes who never-
theless are later identified as politically insignificant and thus without the required opportunity to 
convert ideas into reality (see e.g. Luebbert 1987: 449-450). And finally, answering ‘why’ they are 
motivated, at the attitudinal level, to behave in a certain way is pertinent. For instance, powerful 
presidents and military elites are not always responsible for democratic breakdown even though 
they have the means to do so. The state actors that I point out are either vital for motivating or 
enabling democratic breakdown.  
 
The remainder of the paper contains theorization of seven mechanisms connecting the state with 
democratic breakdown on the basis of these criteria for who, how, and why. I then illustrate how 
these mechanisms may be analyzed by making use of the democratic breakdowns of the interwar 
period. The interwar democratic breakdowns are not only among the most paradigmatic for extant 
theories of democratization and democratic stability. Aspects of the state have also been proposed 
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as important in explaining why some democracies broke down and others survived the economic 
crises of the period (see Bermeo 1997: 19). Yet, this proposition still needs a systematic examina-
tion.  
 
Before the disaggregated theorization and application of the mechanisms, I present the theory of 
how the state, despite its different mechanisms, at an overall level stabilizes democracies.      
 
The state and the distributionist model of democracy 
 
This paper aligns with the distinctions of state and regime from Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning 
(2014; for similar distinctions, see also Mazzuca and Munck 2014). I thus define the overarching 
concept of state as the organization with the capacity to impose law and order and to construct and 
implement policies within a clearly demarcated territory and the claim to legitimacy as the primary 
political unit of the territory.3 Three conceptually distinct aspects of the state – monopoly on vio-
lence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement - relate to each part of this definition.  
A monopoly on violence entails the capacity of the military and police to impose public order 
throughout the territory of the state. This involves three necessary and jointly sufficient compo-
nents. First, the state is the superior coercive force vis-à-vis societal forces combined. Second, mo-
nopoly on violence implies high cohesion among the security forces. That is, the military and police 
are effectively functioning hierarchical organizations with professionally educated members. Third, 
the military and police must accept ultimate subordination to the political executive in matters of 
their organizational interests (salary, level of administrative autonomy, and political prerogatives) 
(see Nordlinger 1977: 64-76; Stepan 1988: Ch. 6). Lack of subordination is identified by a pattern of 
conflicts with the political level over the organizational interests of the security forces prior to the 
breakdown of democracy.  
 
Administrative effectiveness is the capacity of the civil administration, including the judiciary, to 
construct and implement policies regarding public services and regulations accurately, swiftly, and 
with high quality throughout the territory. The three components here are first, a penetration by 
administrative structures of the territory of the state entailing a relatively stable connection between 
center and periphery by which laws, decrees, and other political signals are communicated. Second, 
                                                     
3
 I sometimes refer to the state strengths and weaknesses as matters of stateness.  
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administrative effectiveness hinges on the existence of a functioning civil service system basing 
recruitment and promotion of personnel on merits rather than political status or social connections. 
The third requirement regards the responsiveness of the civil administration implying a willingness 
to serve with equal effectiveness any government decision, no matter its content (see Dunleavy 
1985; Rauch and Evans 2000). Unresponsiveness is identified by a pattern of interrupted or sabo-
taged implementation of government policies prior to the democratic breakdown. 
 
I conceive of citizenship agreement as the sheer agreement on who are and could potentially be the 
members of the state. There are two necessary and jointly sufficient components which I term mu-
tual subgroup acceptance and state legitimacy. First, mutual subgroup acceptance requires that the 
significant ethnic subgroups (along racial, religious, or linguistic lines) inside the state territory ac-
cept each other’s presence which may often be conceived as the absence of profound group differ-
ences based on ethnic belonging. Second, it entails a measure of state legitimacy – that is, a com-
mon, or at least non-conflictual, view of the state as an ethnocultural symbol (see Linz and Stepan 
1996: 16; Gellner 2006; Stepan, Yadav, and Linz 2011). Ethnic conflicts and state illegitimacy are 
identified by expressed or visible grievances between ethnic groups or against the state as an eth-
nocultural symbol prior to the democratic breakdown. 
 
I define democracy as a political regime producing governments from free, fair, and inclusive elec-
tions. I, however, pragmatically lower the demands for inclusiveness to entail suffrage for only half 
of the adult male population (see Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2012). In turn, I understand democratic 
stability as the continued existence of these elections. As will be specified, there are four types of 
democratic breakdown to which the state may relate: 1) a civil war which postpones elections indef-
initely; 2) a coup d’état by the state military; 3) a paramilitary coup d’état (by oppositional forces); 
and 4) an incumbent takeover by which the sitting executive undermines democratic institutions 
(see e.g. Linz 1978: Ch. 4; Svolik 2015). The mechanisms relate in different ways to these four types 
but these differences are not important from the perspective of evaluating the mechanisms.    
 
Probing an independent effect of the state on democratic stability first of all requires a separation 
from the effect of processes of socioeconomic modernization or, more generally, levels of econom-
ic development. Indeed, state-building is part of modernization in Weberian and Marxian thought. 
Recent decades have seen a reinvigoration of modernization theory which can be summed up in the 
‘distributionist model of democracy’ (see Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix 2003; Ansell and 
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Samuels 2014). In this model, democracy endures as a result of a high level of economic develop-
ment which ensures that the elite costs of rebellion are higher than the benefits of accepting the 
redistributions that follow from democracy (Przeworski 2005: 253-254).  
 
While my theory basically concurs with this model, its point of departure is that the model wrongly 
assumes the state to be in place. Countries at the same level of economic development do not enter 
into a democratic regime period with the same level of stateness (cf. Huntington 1968; Evans 1995; 
Grindle 1996). In turn, there is no guarantee that economic development levels or the democratic 
institutions as such are continuously enforced and trusted. These must be maintained by a central-
ized authority, the state.4 The variation in democratic stability among postcommunist and Latin 
American countries testifies to this (Linz and Stepan 1996).     
 
In contrast to the distributionist model, there are three paths to democratic breakdown based on 
the status of stateness and the subsequent processes occurring after a successful transition to de-
mocracy. While I assume that democracies at very high levels of economic development are more 
or less sure of stability (cf. Svolik 2008) by being robust to future poor performance by the regime, 
at least in the medium term, it is at lower levels of development that the effect of stateness kicks in.    
The first path takes place in democracies with low levels of economic development. Here, we likely 
find a majority of anti-systemic, including anti-democratic and secessionist, forces. Because these 
forces are initially warry of democracy, promises or actual delivery of some alleged goods of de-
mocracy will not satisfy them – at least not in the short term. Consequently, stability can only be 
achieved as a short-term strategy via pure containment (e.g. arrests, ban enactments, protest disso-
lutions) to curb anti-systemic mobilization.  
 
The second and third paths include democracies of medium-level development. This level of de-
velopment likely implies a prevalence of what Linz (1978) has termed ‘semi-loyalists’. Among these 
actors, support for democracy is initially indeterminate and thus amendable to democracy’s perfor-
mance. However, to understand the basis of a democracy’s performance we must take stock of at 
least one basic condition besides stateness: the growth of the economy. Levels of wealth determine 
the initial ppopular inclination to support democracy but whether or not the economy is growing 
determines the likelihood that people can be persuaded into support.  
                                                     
4
 A point that Przeworski (2003; 2005: 266-267) raises himself but does not pursue. 
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In the second path, the economy is either stagnant or in recession. Here, stability can only be 
achieved through a combination of containment of anti-systemic forces and management of the 
social hardships connecting with economic crisis such as unemployment and poverty. Even though 
situations of security and economic crises are only occasional, they are highly salient (see Bernhard, 
Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003; Gilley 2006). The third path takes place where the economy is 
growing. This makes crisis management obsolete. Anti-systemic forces do, however, still rise. Thus, 
containment is still relevant as a stabilizing device.  
 
The level of development and status of the economy are constants in the framework that I provide. 
They are snapshots of the initial structural reality with which actors are faced. When these are set, it 
is possible, as seen, to distinguish between three different paths towards democratic breakdown. 
My core theoretical claim is that low levels of stateness lower the ability to contain anti-systemic 
forces and manage socioeconomic and security-related crises. In turn, it raises the likelihood that 
the processes outlined will lead to democratic breakdown rather than stability. When taking a look 
at processes preceding democratic breakdowns in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Sahara Afri-
ca, and East Asia alike, containment and crisis management are important instruments for the polit-
ical elites that nevertheless occasionally fail. For the state-democracy nexus, the key question is 
whether state actors – the bureaucrats and military and police officials in the state apparatus and 
ethnic groups in society –work, deliberately or not, to safeguard democracy.  
 
In the next section, I argue how and why these state actors may contribute to democratic break-
down via containment or crisis management. Rather than an exhaustive list of possible mechanisms 
connecting the state with democratic breakdown, the section presents seven mechanisms that fare 
prominently in the literature. I start with the mechanisms from disputed monopoly on violence and 
proceed to administrative ineffectiveness and citizenship disagreement. The mechanisms contain a 
number of steps which must be observed for the mechanism to be vindicated. These are explicated 
in figures.        
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Mechanisms connecting the state to democratic breakdown 
 
Disputed monopoly on violence 
 
A disputed monopoly on violence - either via simple resource problems, lack of coherence, lack of 
subordination, or some combination of these deficiencies – may spur two mechanisms leading to 
democratic breakdown. I term the first mechanism an ‘authoritarian restoration’. Here, opposition 
or incumbent elites succeed in a coup d’état or rebellion because of poor containment by the secu-
rity forces. Alternatively, the state military initiates a coup d’état to restore its organizational pow-
ers. This is inspired by the theories of military power in civil matters in young, typically Latin Amer-
ican, democracies (Linz 1978: Ch. 5; Stepan 1988: Chs. 6-7) as well as the democracies with low 
coercive capacity in Sub-Sahara Africa. The other mechanism regards a ‘security delegitimization’, 
that is, a weakening of performance legitimacy in security matters which radicalizes the masses in 
turn provoking martial law, a revolutionary coup d’état, or civil war. Research has focused less ex-
plicitly on this mechanism (some exceptions are the globally applied theories of Tilly 2007; Roth-
stein 2011) but it is likely a relevant one given the importance of security in regime performance.  
 
Of all seven, these two mechanisms are arguably the most complicated to evaluate because of the 
intimate relationship between politicians and military figures in many young democracies. The eval-
uation of authoritarian restorations is easened, however, because I explicitly demand concessions to 
the military in order to increase confidence that military ‘restoration of organizational powers’ 
caused breakdown. Evaluating security delegitimization is easened because security forces typically 
have a large degree of autonomy in security matters in democracies, disregarding the ideological 
stand of the government. Hence, even though implementations are no better than the content of 
the policies and vice versa, the government’s role in setting the content of policies is disregarded in 
both mechanisms as it can largely be assumed to be as focused on security as possible. Still, the 
observation of government orders to provide security which are then poorly implemented would 
increase the uniqueness of the examination. 
 
Authoritarian restorations play out in either of two paths. The upper path in Figure 1 below occurs 
in democracies with low levels of economic development or, alternatively, in medium-developed 
democracies where the economy is growing. As indicated, destabilization in such regimes should 
pertain to failed containment. Generally, but particularly clear in this path, two very different moti-
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vations may drive security forces, depending on the specific type of problem pertaining to monopo-
ly on violence. If the disputed monopoly on violence stems from either a lack of resources or cohe-
sion, we should observe expressions of constitutional values, order, and stability which are, howev-
er, frustrated by stalled implementation or internal disagreement about the appropriate means to be 
employed. In turn, paramilitary coup plotters are actually fought but without success. This leads to 
an overthrow or civil war if military powers are more balanced between the paramilitary and state 
military forces. Note that the failure of containment here is not due to a lack of willingness to pro-
tect democracy or the constitution as such but rather a weak ability to do so. Otherwise, the mech-
anism would amount to a somewhat trivial claim that democracy broke down because the military 
was anti-democratic. 
 
The second motivation stems from a lack of subordination. This is a very different dynamic be-
cause we are here looking for security forces turning their backs on democracy. Their reasoning is, 
however, important: the security forces have come to conceive of democracy as too much of a 
threat to their organizational powers. They originally wanted to maintain or increase their powers 
but have been turned down by the government. Often, these forces align with generally authoritari-
an cadres of the military. The observable implications of this motivation are attitudes of praetorian-
ism or military autonomy in budgetary and/or policy decision-making beyond purely means of 
coercion (cf. Stepan 1988: 92, 100). In turn, the state military may initiate a coup d’état, support an 
oppositional one, or an incumbent takeover that favors their interests.  
 
It may of course also be that a successful military intervention actually saves democracy. This is 
what happens when martial law is initiated as a legal instrument of the constitution, public order 
restored, and a date for new elections is set within reasonable time. However, I do not expect such 
a mechanism. Rather, if the monopoly on violence is disputed, I expect martial law to become per-
manent and thus end in democratic breakdown.          
 
The lower path in Figure 1 whereby the ‘authoritarian restoration’ mechanism plays out involves 
the medium-level democracies where the economy is stagnant or in recession. Crisis management is 
here a relevant parameter alongside containment. Whether grievances are socioeconomically based 
or related to security, the military and police gain prominence as actors of containment in the same 
way as in the upper path. Even though the need for containment is arguably less pressing due to 
fewer anti-systemic forces, the motivations of the security forces are basically the same: contain-
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ment of the threat within constitutional boundaries if resource-insufficiency and/or incoherence or 
containment via extra-constitutional means if lack of subordination. However, the behavior of un-
derequipped and/or factionalized security forces is not only observed in the phase when an actual 
attack on democracy is attempted. The phase of mobilization is also relevant. Here, containment 
hinges on the ability to identify the antisystemic forces. Security forces with a genuine interest in 
containment should be observed trying to track down these movements or dissolve them. This 
battle is, however, lost due to weak intelligence work and coordination. The behavior by autono-
mous security forces is the same as in the upper path as they may try to install military rule with or 
without direct support of the opposition to restore their organizational powers. Such a coup d’état 
may thus also occur preemptively.          
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
          
The rest of the mechanisms differ from authoritarian restorations in that their unique effect is not 
found in the last step from attempt to successful breakdown. In any breakdown, the security forces 
enter the equation in the last step where final containment is a possibility. But the remaining mech-
anisms, if all their implications are observed, exist no matter the actions of security forces in this 
last step.  
 
The ‘security delegitimization’ (Figure 2) mechanism typically regards medium-level democraices 
with a stagnant or declining economy. Here, we must either observe that autonomous security forc-
es engage in dissolution of crowds that are not sanctioned by government orders. Alternatively, in 
case of low levels of resources or incoherence among the security forces, we must observe that they 
conduct weak identification and unsuccessful fighting (via, for instance, arrests) of crimes and vio-
lent conflicts. Either way, there is an ‘unsuccessful enforcement of monopoly on violence’. 
 
In young democracies, the experience of arbitrary violence or that violent conflict is spinning out of 
control might be the specific trigger of public agitation and mobilization for military rule with easier 
access to repression. In this way, masses or elites can grow anti-systemic and attempt a coup d’état 
or circumvention of political and civil rights.  
  
[Figure 2 about here] 
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Administrative ineffectiveness 
 
I expect three mechanisms leading from administrative ineffectiveness to democratic breakdown. 
Expectedly, they are only relevant in medium-developed democracies with a stagnant or declining 
economy. They thus concern failed crisis management. The first mechanism, which I name ‘socio-
economic delegitimization’, captures some of the most profound examples of processes of break-
down in democracies strained by economic recession (see e.g. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 
2003), or those democracies whose state apparatuses are out of line with the social structures and 
thus incapable of delivering the demanded socioeconomic transformation (see e.g. O’Donnell 2007; 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). The second mechanism is termed ‘elite bias delegit-
imization’ to describe the process that may emerge from a certain type of administrative ineffec-
tiveness, namely that of a politicized administration that implements socioeconomic policies, civil 
liberties, or property rights in a way that biases against the oppositional party elite thus provoking a 
coup attempt. The third mechanism is termed ‘mass bias legitimization’ and describes the specific 
mass dynamics of this sort of process. While the process in the elite-based mechanism is structured 
around foreseeable party political dynamics and is thus relatively easy to predict, the mass-based 
process is muddier, ends in rebellion, and has the particular explosive potential of leading to civil 
war. Particularly Latin American democracies have been scrutinized along the lines of these theories 
of elite and mass discrimination (see e.g. O’Donnell 2007; Cornell and Lapuente 2014).  
 
Socioeconomic delegitimization (Figure 3) is a mass-based mechanism. When an economic reces-
sion or stagnation produces social hardships such as unemployment, impoverishment, and feelings 
of relative deprivation, grievances are raised in the borader public – particularly among those with 
the fewest resources to start with. It is these concerns that the government and civil service must 
address. Since socioeconomic policy issues are deeply ideological and usually clearly differentiate 
the political right and left, the content of the governments’ policy reactions to the public’s concerns 
cannot be taken as a given as in security matters. For instance, right-wing governments will tend to 
propose means and ends of fiscal austerity in times of recession while left-wing governments pro-
pose countercyclical policies by tax exemptions or public investments. As civil servants hinge on 
receiving such executive policy orders, and given that the quality of any policy is inherently difficult 
to classify a priori, the examination of socioeconomic delegitimization is strongest when it is ob-
served that the government actually initiates policies targeted directly at the hardships of the eco-
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nomic crisis. Only in this case can it be forcefully shown that the civil service is responsible for any 
poor performance.  
 
The behavior of the civil service in socioeconomically relevant ministries and agencies must then, 
on an overall account, have one or both of the following features: When the civil service is politi-
cized or patrimonial, the implementation of the government proposals is either delayed or inaccu-
rate. Alternatively, when civil servants are unresponsive, implementation is interrupted or sabo-
taged.  
 
A likely result of such problematic implementation is thatangry crowds turn anti-systemic by calling 
for some form of economic authoritarianism, that is, as we know from present-day China and Latin 
America in the 1970s and 1980s, a system of economic management by authoritarian means. This 
sort of process may then repeat itself causing further grievances and polarization and eventually 
provoke coup attempts or rebellions. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
’Elite bias delegitimization’ (Figure 4) assumes an initial atmosphere of dissatisfaction with socioec-
onomic conditions. As grievances increase, the opposition may radicalize. This may provoke the 
government to engage in undermining the rule of law and initiate discriminating policies against the 
opposition elite. The key observable implications begin with civil servants in politicized administra-
tions. Given the direct dependence of their job on the will of the elected incumbents, they likely 
provide weakly credible limits to executive power which lead to biased policies in matters of socio-
economic distribution and rule of law. This transforms the broadbased grievances into more con-
centrated antagonizing of the opposition against the incumbents. In contrast to socioeconomic 
delegitimization, the problem here is not stalled implementation but rather the opposite, namely 
too precise and uncritical implementation. Thus, by contrast to a meritocratic system which is insti-
tutionally placed to balance government orders against the rule of law, we must observe direct and 
uncritical implementation.  
 
The relevant policy areas are socioeconomic rights as well as civil liberties and property rights pro-
vision. Thus, we might, for instance, observe the civil service giving impunity for government party 
members, violating the rule of law through arbitrary arrests of opposition forces, or illegally seizing 
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their property. In socioeconomic matters, we might observe unfair distribution of social benefits 
with discrimination of certain social or economic groups.  
 
In turn, we must observe that the opposition party elites rally to end these (perceived) injustices 
with extra-constitutional means. In some cases, coup attempts are carried out because the incum-
bents are ousted in an election. In this case, the mechanism would predict the same process to un-
fold, only with a new set of incumbents and opposition elites. In any case, however, we must even-
tually observe a coup attempt. This is likely paramilitary but the state military, backed by incum-
bents or not, may also initiate a coup as a precaution of the opposition threat.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
‘Mass bias delegitimization’ (Figure 5) is equal to elite bias delegitimization in terms of the sequence 
of events and the behavior and attitudes of actors. However, the actors, and thus the particular 
arena of action, are at the mass-level. Masses are more diverse and by definition farther away from 
executive political power than elites, and their behavior may thus be less rational and predictable 
indicating a different kind of process. Specifically, the issues of the means and timing of govern-
ment reaction and military coup attempts are therefore harder to determine a priori. Otherwise, the 
same dynamic applies: A politicized administration may bias against a whole population group, 
either based on socioeconomic, ethnic, or other criteria. The unifying characteristic of the targeted 
groups, however, is their attachment to the opposition. For instance, governments may engage in 
biased policies because it sees executive power as an opportunity of exploitation of resources and 
favoritism of certain groups over others – predatory states are extreme cases hereof. In turn, the 
mass opposition are radicalized and provoked to attempt a coup or rebellion. Due to the unpredict-
able dynamics of radicalization among the masses in this mechanism, civil war is a particularly likely 
outcome.                  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Citizenship disagreement 
 
The first mechanism connecting citizenship disagreement with democratic breakdown regards the 
destabilizing effect of ‘citizenship violence’ (Figure 6). This mechanism may occur in any of the 
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three overall paths outlined earlier and thus concerns both containment and crisis management. It 
captures the great variety of democratic instability in diverse societies which, for instance, domi-
nates in Sub-Saharan Africa but also in countries in the Balkans or in Sri Lanka where religion is a 
vital source of political conflict. It thus relates to the works of Horowitz (1985), Wimmer (2013), 
and others on the severity of ethnic conflicts and their consequences for civic order (see also Alesi-
na et al. 2003).  
 
From a starting point of stability, we would expect to observe violence between those ethnic 
groups that do not accept each other’s presence in the same country. If the problem instead per-
tains to state illegitimacy, we might also see violent attacks on state symbols and representatives. 
The insight is that the likelihood of violence increases with the level of citizenship disagreement 
and so increases the risk that containment of actual threats to democracy fails.  
 
Whether violence is inter-ethnic or directed at the state, it may set in motion one of three mobiliza-
tions. The more radical the mobilization, the more likely is breakdown. The most radical one is a 
reversal of the ethnic situation observed by racist ideas, including xenophobia and calls for ethnic 
apartheid or hegemony. An equally radical mobilization centers on a wish for secession: an exit 
from the state. The least radical one involves a wish for equality and incorporation in the political 
system of the minority or majority ethnic groups in question. Even this claim can spur radical reac-
tions from incumbents or their supporters. Alternatively, the state military takes action (preemp-
tively or not) and installs a military dictatorship to end violence.  
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
             
The mechanism of ‘citizenship injustices’ (Figure 7) occurs in medium-developed democracies with 
stagnating or regressing economy. It builds on the same literature as citizenship violence but cap-
tures a different dynamic, namely the often debilitating dynamics of state integration amidst eco-
nomically strained conditions. Citizenship disagreements lower the ability to manage crises in a 
legitimate way because disitribution of socioeconomic goods may augment existing ethnic cleavag-
es.  
 
First, it must be observed that ethnic groups express concerns over socioeconomic injustices that 
they perceive to exist between them. Unemployment and wages may be perceived to be skewed 
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against particular ethnic groups. The concerns may be either elite- or mass-based but the heart of 
the matter is that they become salient issues for the parliament and government. Ethnic divisions 
are exacerbated or created within or between the parties in parliament (or in a coalitional govern-
ment) resulting in polarization as they are driven to opposite extremes on a scale of ethnic and so-
cioeconomic distribution. In turn, governments fail to promulgate action on the expressed con-
cerns or only initiate half measures – all in all ineffective policy responses as a result of the govern-
ment’s credence to polarization.  
 
The ethnic groups are then radicalized further. They may then align their cause with lukewarm sup-
porters of democracy. Accordingly, we should observe agitations among either elite or mass seg-
ments of these groups to mobilize for a socioeconomic upheaval implying reversed ethnocracy. The 
less radical demand is an economic authoritarian regime but it must be observed that they rally 
around inter-ethnic redistribution. From this point on the centrifugal logic leading to coup attempt 
or rebellion likely sets in. 
  
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Empirical analysis 
To illustrate how these mechanisms might work in actual empirical analyses, I have identified the 
observable implications of the seven mechanisms in all the democratic breakdowns of the interwar 
period. Basing the identification of democracies on Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s (2014) codings, there 
are 14 democratic breakdowns between 1919 and 1939.  
 
I have coded stateness in all democratic years prior to breakdown and the observableimplications 
of the mechanisms. I have relied on biographies and historical case and comparative studies.5 In 
what follows, I use this data to answer two separate but interconnected questions. First, to what 
extent are there weaknesses in the three aspects of the state in the breakdown cases? I discuss the 
pattern of development in the three aspects during the interwar years. This provides initial descrip-
tive inferences in the sense of identifying those cases of weak stateness where some or more of the 
                                                     
5
 Full analyses of all cases, including coding rules and threshold ambiguities, are available in the appendices. I engaged 
a research assistant to code 5 of the 14 cases by random selection (Greece 1926-1936; Germany 1919-1933; Lithuania 
1920-1926; Uruguay 1919-1934; Portugal 1918-1926) as a reliability check on my own codings. My codings did not 
differ from those of the research assistant but the threshold ambiguities reflect the need for greater precision in my 
coding criteria.     
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mechanisms may be relevant. Second, is any of the mechanisms observable in the breakdown cas-
es? For each aspect, I identify the mechanisms for each case and the total number of mechanisms 
across the cases. Connecting with the first question, this examination only focuses on the cases of 
state weakness. That is, where a given state aspect is strong, the mechanisms attached are excluded 
from consideration. Along the way, I identify whether any temporal and regional clustering exists.  
 
The development of stateness                      
 
Table 1 shows the status of the stateness aspects and their components in the year before demo-
cratic breakdown. This is based on the assumption that observing a given mechanism only makes 
sense if the relevant stateness aspect was weak in the year preceding breakdown.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Focusing on the state weaknesses pertaining to monopoly on violence, 5 of 14 had problems with 
resource supremacy of the military and police forces. This is a relatively low number when com-
pared to the other two components of monopoly on violence showing no less than 10 and 12 cases 
with problems in cohesion and subordination, respectively. This discrepancy between the three 
components of monopoly on violence shows the importance of disggregation: Based only on re-
source supremacy, we would infer that monopoly on violence was present in as many as 8 of 14 
cases (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Portugal, Germany, Latvia, Greece, and Poland). However, these 
8 cases would not be considered for the analysis of mechanisms even though their state weaknesses 
may have been highly relevant for democratic breakdown. The distinction between cohesion and 
subordination of the security forces seems less relevant. Only 3 cases (Germany, Latvia, and Spain) 
experienced problems in one but not the other of these two components. Nevertheless, a discrep-
ancy of merely one case in principle justifies disaggregation.  
 
Moving on to the trajectories of monopoly on violence during the interwar years, 13 of 14 democ-
racies (except Estonia) had a disputed monopoly on violence in the year before their breakdown. 
This fact points to monopoly on violence as a widespread problem and potential cause of break-
down. Interestingly, only Spain experienced a backdrop in monopoly on violence during the inter-
war years. Resource supremacy was lost during the spring and summer of 1936 as Franco’s forces 
entered Spain whereas the subordination of the military became problematic already from 1932 
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when the budget reforms and sidelining of the ordinary military by leftist Prime Minister Azana 
took hold. Otherwise, monopoly on violence remained constant in most cases, including notably 
the Latin American countries which went through WWI and the transition to democracy largely 
untouched.  
 
Where changes did occur, they were to the better. Quite a few cases started their democratic period 
with a disputed monopoly on violence which then strengthened years before their democratic 
breakdown. This particularly concerned the establishment of resource supremacy and security force 
coherence. Lack of subordination was a somewhat more recalcitrant problem.6     
 
Moving on to the state weaknesses pertaining to administrative effectiveness, challenges to territo-
rial penetration ensued in only 3 of 14 cases whereas the arguably more demanding components of 
meritocracy and responsiveness were weak in 12 and 13 cases, respectively. Again, as with monopo-
ly on violence, disaggregation to the component level is vital: If coding monopoly on violence as 
present based solely on territorial penetration, we would be wrong in no less than 10 cases (Uru-
guay, Chile, Portugal, Latvia, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia). When com-
paring to the weaknesses of monopoly on violence, a similar pattern seems to emerge: Extending 
physical authority is less of a problem than building a reliable force of administrators that can take 
advantage of the physical structures to implement policies effectively. The only democracy that had 
achieved administrative effectiveness before its breakdown was Austria.  
 
As with monopoly on violence, administrative ineffectiveness was a widespread problem in turn 
making it a potentially important explanation for democratic breakdown. In 13 of 14 democracies 
(except Austria), administrative ineffectiveness existed the year before breakdown. No democracy 
experienced a backdrop in any of the components. Yet, only two cases, Latvia and Estonia, experi-
enced improvements. Territorial penetration in Estonia followed the lines of the dissemination of 
military resource supremacy obtained by the Treaty of Tartu in early 1920 – specifically, penetration 
could build on the administrative autonomy and unification of the major regions and towns of the 
Tallinn area and Northern Livland from 1905. The Latvian and Estonian state-building paths of the 
interwar period were very similar. As a general rule, Latvian developments were shortly delayed, 
                                                     
6
 Studies of the cases of improvements in monopoly on violence (Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Germany, and Austria) can be 
seen in Appendix I to understanding of the dynamics of security apparatuses in the 1920s and 1930s. 
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around a year, relative to Estonia. This was also the case for territorial penetration which was ob-
tained in 1920.  
 
The Estonian and Latvian cases notwithstanding, we see a strong tendency that the states were 
mirred in constant problems of conducting policy implementation in an effective but also impartial 
manner. The distinction between meritocracy and responsiveness seems less relevant here since 
only one case, Germany, experienced problems in one, i.e. responsiveness, but not the other of 
these two components. Otherwise, there is a perfect overlap between the remaining 12 cases show-
ing problems of meritocracy and responsiveness alike. Still, the German case in itself justifies dis-
aggregation between meritocracy and responsiveness.7 Of more interest are the substantial differ-
ences in problems of administrative ineffectiveness that may be withdrawn.      
 
Problems were all-encompassing in Latin Europe and the offsprings in Latin America. Here, unre-
sponsiveness was constituted by state employee corruption and persistent patrimonial structures 
locally as well as politically motivated hirings and firings in the central bureaucracy. This obstructed 
the stability of any meritocratic system.  
 
For these Latin democracies, administrative ineffectiveness could be particularly damaging because 
the conditions for all three mechanisms – socioeconomic delegitimization, elite bias delegitimiza-
tion, and mass bias delegitimization – were all present. This is basically the same for the Baltic 
States although problems of politicization, patrimonialism, and corruption of civil servants were 
much less systematic and occurred within a much weaker bureaucratic framework.     
 
The differences in the development of citizenship agreement to those of the two state capacities are 
not stark but nevertheless notable. Disrespect between ethnic groups as well as state illegitimacy 
existed in 9 of 14 cases. The differences in the codings of the components are thus much fewer for 
citizenship agreement than for the two state capacities. For instance, basing the coding of citizen-
ship agreement on state legitimacy alone would result in wrong inferences about only 2 cases – a 
much smaller error rate than for the other two state aspects. On the one hand, this points out the 
intimate relationship between state legitimacy and mutual subgroups acceptance. On the other 
                                                     
7
 For an analysis of this peculiar coding, see Appendix I regarding Germany.  
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hand, the partial overlapping of codings between the components does not disqualify the idea of 
disaggregation.8  
 
Looking instead at the overall pattern, we find citizenship agreement in 4 of 14 cases (Argentina, 
Estonia, Uruguay, and Portugal). And no democracy experienced a backdrop in any of the two 
components. There are no obvious common factors between those four countries besides their 
citizenship agreement. Argentina and Uruguay exemplify violent nation-building as natives were 
slaughtered, driven to the territories’ outskirts, or brutally assimilated through marriage with the 
European settlers. Portugal’s road to nationhood was different as it resembles the much longer-
term European path through the middle ages. Estonia’s nation was of course much younger, 
emerging as an idea in late 19th century and forming materially after WWI.  
 
Still, 10 cases exhibited citizenship disagreement the year before breakdown. This corroborates the 
general impression of sizeable problems of establishing citizenship agreement and a notable poten-
tial for explaining the democratic breakdowns. As regarding monopoly on violence and administra-
tive effectiveness, path dependencies straitjacketed positive developments of nation-building alt-
hough the legalistic pressure for minority protection, initiated with the Paris Peace Conference in 
1918, was as large as ever. For instance, neither the series of liberal revolutions in the 19th century 
nor the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera or the inauguration of true democracy in 1931 could solve 
the centuries-old conflict between Castile Spain and Catalonia as well as the Basque Country. Alter-
natively, as in the imperial successor states of the Baltics, Poland, and Yugoslavia WWI and the 
resulting border changes served to forge a new set of territorial ethnic cleavages.    
 
 The analyses of state weaknesses above point to regional patterns that largely corroborate extant 
theories of state- and nation-building in medieval (e.g. Ertman 1997) and 19th century Europe and 
Latin America (see e.g. Rothschild 1974; Shefter 1977; Silberman 1993; Ertman 1997; Kurtz 2013).  
As we would expect, matters of resource supremacy and territorial penetration as well as both mu-
tual subgroup acceptance and state legitimacy were most problematic where states were young, as 
in the Eastern European successor states to the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. 
Broadly speaking, stateness was stronger in older states. This is not surprising given the selection of 
strong states via mechanisms of war and inter-state competition. Also expectedly, problems of mer-
                                                     
8
 Consider here, for instance, the cases of Austria and Greece which exemplify the ways that the two components 
developed and often conflicted with one another (see Appendix I). 
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itocracy and responsiveness of civil servants were all-encompassing in Latin Europe and the off-
springs in Latin America. Feudalism weighed heavily on local administrations in Portugal, Spain, 
and Italy (and Greece in a less clear-cut fashion). This patrimonialism came to coincide with top-
level politicization when they entered the era of mass politics in the 19th century. State-building in 
Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, which first achieved their independence after the French Revolution 
and the delegitimization of feudalism, brought along weaker limits on executive power and weaker 
patrimonialism but more streamlined politicization of civil servants. Thus, some old states never 
got rid of its stateness problems because they had become embedded as the logic of how politics 
functioned.      
 
One case fits less neatly into the dominating models of state- and nation-building: Germany. That 
citizenship agreement was problematic in Germany is congruent with the literature on late state 
formation and the inadequacies of imperial rule for nation-building. Yet, the development of effec-
tive state administrations in the 19th and early 20th centuries is much less accounted for in the com-
parative literature. Particularly, responsiveness was threatened and could sometimes be lost despite 
the existence of meritocracy.  
 
Which overall lessons should we take on for the analysis of mechanisms? From Table 1, it is clear 
that stateness, whether in terms of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, or citizen-
ship agreement, was improving more than degenerating. However, as is evident the most dominat-
ing observation is weakness and stability of the three state aspects. The more qualitatively demand-
ing issues of personnel control and organization in the military and the civil service were particular-
ly hard to reform. And ethnic cleavages stuck. The most dominating observation is of multiple 
problems of stateness in each democracy prior to breakdown. All three aspects of state weakness - 
disputed monopoly on violence, administrative ineffectiveness, and citizenship disagreement – are 
represented by more than twothirds of the cases. This does not primarily reflect weaknesses in 
territorial penetration and resource supremacy. Weaknesses are thus most frequent in the compo-
nents that we expect to be the most powerful determinants of democratic breakdown. Alltogether, 
all three state factors could be important explanations for the interwar democratic breakdowns.  
Table 1, however, points to the relevance of disaggregating the stateness concept. No democracy 
was strong in all three aspects. Only one case achieved monopoly on violence and administrative 
effectiveness, respectively, while four cases achieved citizenship agreement and only Estonia 
achieved more than one aspect, namely monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement. Notably, 
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more democracies had problems with monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness than 
with citizenship agreement, providing initial leverage for the two state capacity mechanisms. As for 
the components, it is instructive to see the ability of each aspect to predict the others: If basing the 
judgment on only one aspect, we are sure to judge stateness correctly in 9 of 14 cases: Poland, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Germany. The remaining 5 cases are Portugal, 
Estonia, Austria, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. They exemplify the essence of a justified disaggre-
gation since our judgement of stateness differs between each aspect of it: They are weak in or two 
aspects of stateness but not in the remaining. Disaggregation at the level of the aspects is therefore 
very much needed as a first step in classifying the democratic regimes correctly. Only disaggregation 
enables us to correctly assess the existence of any of the seven mechanisms and thus judge the ex-
planatory importance of the state. As a result, we can conclude that no mechanism can be preclud-
ed as existing a priori because all three basic state weakenesses are represented. At the component 
level, the fact that a lack of meritocracy exists in 12 cases precludes the exclusion of the elite and 
mass delegitimization mechanisms. 
 
The mechanisms of state weaknesses 
 
Table 2 lists all observed mechanisms. I now analyze the mechanisms of each aspect in turn. Lastly, 
I describe the overall importance of the state and the relative strength of the aspects.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Disputed monopoly on violence 
Both mechanisms of monopoly on violence are represented among the cases: Security delegitimiza-
tion can be identified in 5 cases (Italy, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Germany, and Greece) whereas author-
itarian restorations are present in 8 cases (Italy, Chile, Poland, Portugal, Lithuania, Argentina, 
Greece, and Spain).      
 
There is a certain temporal order regarding the authoritarian restorations in that most of these 
breakdowns occurred early in the interwar period (between Italy’s breakdown in 1922 and Lithua-
nia’s in 1926). The period between 1922 and 1926 was in many countries one of positive economic 
growth, although some cases were stuck in the financial instability of the immediate postwar-years 
(cf. Møller, Schmotz, and Skaaning 2015: 307). Although the mechanism of authoritarian restora-
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tion should be detectable in situations of economic crisis, it is among the few mechanisms which 
should also be detectable in non-crisis years. It is therefore notable that it is the most frequently 
present mechanism in the growth-years of the mid-1920s. In most of these cases, there was actually 
an economic crisis at the time of breakdown but economics did not alter the politics of civil-
military relations in all of them. Some cases, like that of General Pilsudski’s military coup d’état in 
Poland in May 1926, relied exclusively on a combination of civil-military and inter-military conflict 
over the proper organization and role of the military.  
 
Other than the temporal clustering, a regional pattern can be seen. Besides Poland and Lithuania, 
authoritarian restorations were dominated by countries inside the margins of the Latin European 
and American countries. This is no surprise. Indeed, these countries are traditionally counted 
among those with a history of military coups d’état (see e.g. Pion-Berlin 1992). 19th century habits 
of intervening militarily whenever politics failed or produced unwanted policies were often repro-
duced in the interwar period as the inauguration of genuinely free, fair, and inclusive elections 
threatened the privileges of officer corpses.  
 
Regarding the less frequent mechanism of security delegitimization, there is no clear regional pat-
tern (Latin, Central and Eastern European countries cluster together) and cases are quite evenly 
spread across the interwar period. The last point could reflect the fact that security delegimization, 
more so than authoritarian restoration, takes time since anti-regime mobilization among the public 
usually matures over years of dissatisfaction. However, we should not make too much of this as 
there is really no clear temporal pattern concerning the time from transition to breakdown in the 
five relevant cases. The few years of democracy in Italy is one clear example of this.  
 
It should be noted that in 3 cases (Uruguay, Latvia, and Austria), no mechanisms were found alt-
hough monopoly on violence was disputed. There are no clear similarities between these three cas-
es. In fact, they are quite different in many respects, including the specific problems of monopoly 
on violence. The breakdown in Austria illustrates the importance of considering every observable 
implication of the mechanisms with care. For instance, this applies to authoritarian restoration. The 
Austro-fascist regime that Chancellor Dollfuss initiated by dissolving the parliament on March 7, 
1933, was supported by the army and police in its consolidation through 1933 and 1934. There is 
also no doubt that the regular army of Austria was a conservative body along the lines of the Ger-
man Reichswehr. However, neither the army nor the police conspired with Dollfuss in his acts against 
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parliament in March 1933. To the contrary, the democratic breakdown was almost singlehandedly 
planned by Dollfuss. To the extent that there was an outside pressure on Dollfuss to install dicta-
torship, it came from the governmental ally and paramilitary group of Heimwehr.  
 
That the Austrian breakdown was neither a case of authoritarian restoration nor security delegitimi-
zation shows the occasional inadequasies of the mechanisms that hinge on a disputed monopoly on 
violence. Overall, however, the mechanisms of monopoly on violence seem important. They apply 
to a varied group of countries but the temporal and regional patterns of authoritarian restorations 
fit fairly well with the proposition that a disputed monopoly on violence can destabilize democra-
cies under many different economic conditions. Taken together, authoritarian restoration and secu-
rity delegitimization occurred 13 times in 10 different cases.     
 
Administrative ineffectiveness 
The three mechanisms stemming from administrative ineffectiveness are quite evenly and frequent-
ly present among the breakdowns: socioeconomic delegitimization in 7 cases (Chile, Poland, Portu-
gal, Argentina, Germany, Greece, and Spain), elite bias delegitimization in 5 cases (Portugal, Yugo-
slavia, Uruguay, Greece, and Spain), and mass bias delegitimization in 5 as well (Italy, Yugoslavia, 
Argentina, Greece, and Spain).  
 
Starting with socioeconomic delegitmization, there is neither a clear regional nor a celar temporal 
pattern. There are at least two cases, Argentina and Germany, which fit the classic story of the 
Great Depression and democratic breakdown in the 1930s, with the addition that administrative 
ineffectiveness drove this negative effect. Curiously, however, this only seems to concern these 2 
cases of the 6 breakdowns in the immediate period after the crash on Wall Street in 1929. In this 
count, I tentatively include the breakdowns in Argentina, Germany, Austria, Estonia, Uruguay, and 
Latvia from 1931 to 1934. 3 breakdowns (Chile, Poland, and Portugal) occurred in 1925 or 1926 
which are normally attributed as growth-years. This shows the importance of not restraining the 
examination of this mechanism to globally defined crisis-years such as during the Great Depression. 
We should also consider domestic economic crisis as well as, more generally, the social repercus-
sions of crisis following years of recession.  
 
The two similar mechanisms of elite and mass bias delegitimization shows no particular temporal 
ordering. Elite bias delegitimization does, however, apply exclusively to Latin countries, with the 
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exception of Yugoslavia. This is not surprising given Ertman’s (1997) classification of Latin Eu-
rope. What is more interesting is that the problems of politicization and patrimonialism actually 
connected to one of the two bias mechanisms in most of the Latin democracies. Administrative 
ineffectiveness was not just one of the ordinary facts of life in these democracies; it seems also to 
have been consequential for democratic stability.  
 
One explanation for this may be the weak civil societies of Latin countries. As an example of mass 
bias delegitimization, we have Italy which had a much more developed civil society than the other 
Latin cases (cf. Ertman 1998). But it also shows the political complexities that can arise when popu-
lists mobilize people based on a politicization of the state administration. The vibrant civil society 
was polarized in conservatives, which became anti-democratic (or rather oligarchic), and socialists 
which grew into revolutionary syndicalists.   
 
No mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness can explain the democratic breakdowns in the 
Baltics (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) even though all three countries experienced severe prob-
lems of administrative effectiveness. Latvian and Estonian democracies both broke down in 1934 
upon years of economic crisis following the Great Depression. However, the economy in Latvia 
actually recovered quite effectively in 1931-1932 and there was thus no crisis stratum from which to 
mobilize (Rogainis 1971; Scerbinskis 2011: 188). More generally for all three countries, politics was 
formed along ethnic rather than socioeconomic lines. Those socioeconomic conflicts that were 
politicized such as agrarian reform were implemented quite effectively and to the satisfaction of 
most people (see e.g. Graham 1927: 277, 335). The Baltic breakdowns thus show that we should be 
careful in inferring directly from economic crisis to socioeconomic delegitimization or elite or mass 
bias delegitimization.   
 
With this in mind, the overall impression is, however, that the mechanisms of administrative effec-
tiveness are important. Just as those of monopoly on violence, they apply to a varied group of 
countries. They occurred 17 times in 10 different cases.  
 
Citizenship disagreement 
The two mechanisms of citizenship agreement, citizenship violence and citizenship injustices, are 
present among 2 (Italy and Yugoslavia) and 7 (Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Germany, Lat-
via, and Spain) cases, respectively. When compared to the other mechanisms, we thus have an in-
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teresting proposition. Citizenship violence seems less relevant whereas citizenship injustices fares 
prominently.   
 
Given the limited explanatory importance of citizenship violence, I limit myself to commenting on 
citizenship injustices. Whereas there is no clear temporal pattern, it is remarkable that the cases 
featuring this mechanism span across successor states and old European states alike (Spain and the 
admittedly special cases of Italy and Germany which achieved federal union only in the middle of 
the 19th century).   
 
The mechanism of citizenship injustices thus shows no clear regional pattern as it applies to Latin, 
Eastern European, and Central European countries alike. We find most of the cases of citizenship 
injustices where democratic breakdown occurred by coup d’état. However, in particular the Latvian 
case illustrates well that perceived citizenship injustices can be used strategically by the incumbent 
to initiate a successful takeover, an ‘autogolpe’. Whereas there was no real resentments between 
ethnic groups to build on in Estonia, Prime Minister Ulmanis in Latvia could align personal, dicta-
torial ambitions with a pledge for a ‘Latvia for Latvians’. He could rely on a larger sense of dissatis-
faction with governmental performance among the center-right and right parties as well as the secu-
rity forces with the handling of regional and ethnic minority groups, particularly regarding minority 
protection.  
 
Just as for monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness, there are important inadequacies 
regarding the mechanisms of citizenship agreement. In light of the lesser frequency of mechanisms 
of citizenship agreement, these inadequacies are even more important. In 3 cases with citizenship 
disagreement (Chile, Austria, and Greece), neither citizenship violence nor citizenship injustices can 
explain breakdown. These cases are different in many regards, including the type of citizenship 
problem. The Greek case exemplifies how actual violence needs to be observed to probe at citizen-
ship violence. Despite conflicts between natives and refugees in Greece, confrontations between 
them were rarely violent. It also shows that any antagonized actor must be ethnic and politically 
important to probe at citizenship injustices. The prelude to Metaxas coup d’état in 1936 was the 
political fight between anti-Venizelists and Venizelists. However, they mostly conflicted on the 
question of the proper regime: monarchy or republic. Metaxas’ motivation for a coup in 1936 was a 
mixture of self-interest and the restoration of the monarchy. His fascist ideas of ethnic purity only 
developed afterwards.    
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Summing up on the importance of citizenship disagreement for the interwar democratic break-
downs, the mechanisms applied to a varied group of countries, 9 times in 7 different cases. Based 
on the observable implications of the theories of citizenship disagreement and democratic break-
down, we must thus maintain its general importance but we have reason to think of injustices relat-
ed to the distribution of goods between ethnic groups rather than interethnic violence when ex-
plaining democratic breakdowns with citizenship problems.           
 
Overall and relative strengths 
 
Based on the analyses of mechanisms pertaining to the three aspects, we have strong indications 
that they were all important in explaining the interwar democratic breakdowns. Table 2 shows 39 
observed mechanisms from a total of 14 cases and 98 potential mechanisms. This means that there 
are on average slightly more than 3 state-related explanations for each interwar democratic break-
down. The next question is whether the diversity of state weaknesses and state strengths amounts 
to different explanatory strengths of each aspect of the state. This would increase the relevance of 
disaggregation. The first impression is that no such large differences are observable. 9 mechanisms 
stemming from citizenship disagreement are present regarding 7 cases. This makes citizenship 
agreement comparatively least important. Disputed monopoly on violence and administrative inef-
fectiveness are present via 13 (10 cases) and 17 (10 cases) mechanisms, respectively. Thus, if any-
thing, administrative ineffectiveness was the most important destabilizing stateness condition in the 
interwar democracies.  Nevertheless, this obviously far from precludes the importance of either 
monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement in any future analysis.    
 
To back this up even further, there is a very varied influence of stateness on interwar democratic 
breakdowns (see the far right column in Table 2). Noting, importantly, that Estonia and Austria 
cannot be explained by any of the seven mechanisms, there are typically multiple mechanisms pre-
sent in each case. In only two cases (Latvia and Uruguay) did exactly one mechanism contribute to 
democratic breakdown while cases such as Yugoslavia, Spain, Italy, and Greece can be explained by 
5 of 7 possible mechanisms. This strongly indicates the explanatory relevance of a multiplicity of 
state weaknesses.  
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The correlation between the number of state weaknesses and number of mechanisms present 
across the cases is not particularly close. But it is still notable that Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece 
were also among those cases where state weaknesses were all-encompassing and among the cases 
where democracy was typically regarded as particularly vulnerable. Again, this supports the general 
validity of the mechanisms.  
 
There are thus important counter arguments to disaggregation. However, we should take the ex-
planatory differences between the aspects seriously. Moreover, since no case was fully weak or fully 
strong in all of the three stateness aspects and the stateness aspects were rarely all relevant in the 
same cases, we would not only arrive at imprecise predictions of the general effect of stateness but 
also infer plainly wrong single-case explanations of stateness in a substantial number of cases. For 
instance, if measuring stateness solely by citizenship agreement for Portugal, we would wrongly 
exclude the possibility of any destabilizing effect of stateness and thus miss the actual importance 
of no less than four mechanisms. If basing the measurement on monopoly on violence or adminis-
trative effectiveness, other scholars could wrongly interpret any effects as pertaining to citizenship 
agreement. Against this backdrop, it seems justified to conclude that a disaggregated measurement 
of stateness is fruitful. It leads to a more complex but also more correct understanding of the state-
democracy nexus in the interwar period.      
 
State probably needed, disaggregation wanted 
 
In explaining the interwar democratic breakdowns indicates that it may indeed be meaningful to 
speak in general terms of a state-democracy nexus. However, this paper’s analysis has specified this 
in several important respects. First, the state-democracy nexus is general because the state’s various 
influences on democratic stability are unified by the causal forces of containment and crisis man-
agement. Second, the nexus is in fact much more rich in detail and varied in explanatory power. At 
least three aspects – monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement 
– seem highly relevant but in different contexts and to different degrees. If we had not appreciated 
the differences between these aspects, we would have arrived at imprecise and, in some cases, out-
right false descriptive and explanatory inferences. In this way, we may conclude that the state is 
probably needed in explanatory models of democratic stability but disaggregation of the state is 
surely wanted to achieve more correct inferences.   
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The interwar analysis also shows the importance of analyzing mechanisms separately and refraining 
from inference based exclusively on correlational patterns. Indeed, some cases suffered from all-
encompassing state weaknesses which, however, only resulted in one or two of the destabilizing 
mechanisms. Thus, examining the ‘who, how, and why’ of the state-democracy nexus is not just a 
matter of achieving deeper understanding of the causal propositions of the nexus. It is also neces-
sary to get the correct understanding of it. This warrants as many analyses of the state mechanisms 
as there are democratic breakdowns, thus going beyond the interwar period.     
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FIGURE 2, SECURITY DELEGITIMIZATION 
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FIGURE 3, SOCIOECONOMIC DELEGITIMIZATION 
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FIGURE 4, ELITE BIAS DELEGITIMIZATION 
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FIGURE 5, MASS BIAS DELEGITIMIZATION 
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FIGURE 6, CITIZENSHIP VIOLENCE 
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FIGURE 7, CITIZENSHIP INJUSTICES 
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TABLE 1, INTERWAR STATE WEAKENESSES IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWNS 
 
Case (spell) 
 
Monopoly on violence Administrative effectiveness Citizenship agreement 
Resource 
supremacy 
Cohesion Subordina-tion 
Territorial pene-
tration 
Meritocracy Responsive-ness 
Mutual subgroup 
acceptance 
State legitimacy 
Italy (1919-1922)    x     
Chile (1918-1925) x   x     
Poland (1918-1926) x        
Portugal (1918-1926) x   x   x x 
Lithuania (1920-1926)         
Yugoslavia (1921-1929)    x     
Argentina (1918-1931)  x      x x 
Germany (1919-1933)  x x  x x    
Austria (1920-1933)  x x x x x x  
Estonia (1919-1934) x x x x   x x 
Uruguay (1919-1934) x   x   x x 
Latvia (1920-1934)  x x  x     
Greece (1926-1936) x   x    x 
Spain (1931-1937)     x     
Number of cases with component 9 4 2 11 2 1 5 5 
Number of cases with aspect 1 1 4 
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TABLE 2, MECHANISMS CONNECTING INTERWAR STATE WEAKNESSES WITH DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN 
 
Case  
(breakdown year) 
Disputed  
monopoly on violence 
Administrative ineffectiveness Citizenship disagreement  
Authoritarian 
restoration 
Security delegiti-
mization 
Socio- 
economic delegiti- 
mization 
Elite  
bias  
delegiti- 
mization 
Mass  
bias  
delegiti-mization 
Citizenship vio-
lence 
Citizenship injus-
tices 
Number of mecha-
nisms in case 
Italy (1922) x x   x x x 5 
Chile (1925) x  x     2 
Poland (1926) x  x    x 3 
Portugal (1926) x x x x    4 
Lithuania (1926) x      x 2 
Yugoslavia (1929)  x  x x x x 5 
Argentina (1931) x  x  x   3 
Germany (1933)  x x    x 3 
Austria (1933)        0 
Estonia (1934)        0 
Uruguay (1934)    x    1 
Latvia (1934)       x 1 
Greece (1936) x x x x x   5 
Spain (1937) x  x x x  x 5 
Number of cases with 
mechanism 
8 5 7 5 5 2 7 
 
Mechanisms by aspect 13 17 9 
Cases with mechanism by 
aspect 
10 10 7  
 
 
